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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WILLIE ANDERSON,
              Appellant
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. No. 05-cr-00057-002)
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 9, 2009
Before:   SLOVITER, AMBRO and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 14, 2009)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Willie Anderson appeals his sentence, arguing that the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware did not properly consider the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).  Specifically, he alleges that the Court failed to adequately consider his post-
2conviction rehabilitation efforts and erred by refusing to account for the disparity between
state and federal sentences.  Because the District Court considered the appropriate factors
and was not required to account for the disparity between federal and state sentences, we
will affirm. 
I. Background
Anderson pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute five or more grams of
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B).  On January 12, 2006, the
District Court sentenced him to 108 months in prison, the bottom end of the applicable
Sentencing Guidelines range.  Anderson filed a timely appeal.  While his case was on
appeal, Anderson filed a motion with the District Court to have his sentence reduced
based on the amendments to the crack cocaine Sentencing Guidelines.  The District Court
granted his motion and reduced his sentence to 87 months, the bottom end of the amended
Guidelines range. 
On January 5, 2008, we vacated Anderson’s revised sentence and remanded for
resentencing.  In our opinion, we expressed concern that the District Court may have
relied too heavily on the Guidelines range and asked it to “clarify the extent to which it
considered the other sentencing factors, or impose a different sentence after considering
each of the appropriate factors under § 3553(a), if the court did not do that when
imposing Anderson’s sentence.”  United States v. Anderson, 2008 WL 2303507, *2 (3rd
Cir. 2008).
Because this case involved offenses against the laws of the United States, the1
District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction to
review the District Court’s final judgment and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3
On remand, the District Court allowed the parties to submit sentencing memoranda
and, on October 7, 2008, held a resentencing hearing.  After hearing arguments from the
parties, the Court clarified that it had considered all the § 3553(a) factors.  It then adopted
its statements from the first sentencing hearing and reimposed the same 87 month
sentence. 
Anderson filed a timely appeal and argues that the District Court again failed to
consider all of the § 3553(a) factors.  
II. Discussion1
The Supreme Court has explained that a district court commits a procedural error
during sentencing by “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors,
selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence - including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” 
Gall v. United States, --- U.S. --- , 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007).  While a district court’s
bare assertion that it considered the § 3553 factors is not enough, see United States v.
Charles, 467 F.3d 828, 831 (3rd Cir. 2006), sentencing courts are not required to discuss
and make specific findings as to each factor, see United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324,
329 (3rd Cir. 2006).  We examine the entire record to see whether the District Court has
4meaningfully considered the appropriate factors.  See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
355-56 (2007).
The District Court addressed Anderson’s rehabilitation during the first sentencing
hearing, on January 12, 2006.   It explained that it sentenced Anderson to the “low end”
of the Guidelines range because of his efforts to improve his life and encouraged him to
continue those efforts in prison:  “[H]opefully, you’ll continue your rehabilitative efforts
in prison, and come out and be able to be a father to your children, a companion to [the
mother of his child], and a good citizen.”  (App. at 33.)  This analysis, which the Court
provided during the January 12, 2006 sentencing hearing and adopted during the
October 7, 2008 sentencing hearing, is sufficient to show that the Court adequately
considered Anderson rehabilitation efforts in crafting its sentence. 
The District Court correctly declined to consider the disparity between state and
federal sentences.  While 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) states that sentencing courts must
consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct,” this provision concerns
the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among sentences imposed by federal courts for
violations of federal law, not disparities between the potential punishments that may be 
meted out to state and federal defendants.  See United States v. Clark, 434 F.3d 684, 687
(4th Cir.2006) (“The sole concern of section 3553(a)(6) is with sentencing disparities
among federal defendants.”); United States v. Jeremiah, 446 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir.2006)
As several of our sister circuits have observed, “[a]djusting federal sentences to2
conform to those imposed by the states where the offenses occurred would not serve the
purposes of § 3553(a)(6), but, rather, would create disparities within the federal system,
which is what § 3553(a)(6) is designed to discourage.”  United States v. Branson, 463
F.3d 1110, 1112 (10th Cir. 2006); see, e.g., Jeremiah, 446 F.3d at 807-08 (“the
‘Commission’s goal of imposing uniformity upon federal sentences for similarly situated
defendants would be impeded, not furthered,’ if potential federal/state sentencing
discrepancies were considered.”) (quoting United States v. Deitz, 991 F.2d 443, 448 (8th
Cir. 1993)); United States v. Searcy, 132 F.3d 1421, 1422 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam)
(stating that consideration of state penalties would “undermine the goal of uniformity” in
federal sentences); United States v. Haynes, 985 F.2d 65, 69-70 (2d Cir.1993) (same).
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(“Unwarranted sentencing disparities among federal defendants remains the only
consideration under § 3553(a)(6) - both before and after Booker.”).  2
On remand, the District Court clarified that it considered all of the § 3553(a)
factors and adopted the detailed analysis of Anderson’s criminal history, the nature of his
offense, and his post-conviction efforts to improve his life, that it had provided during the
initial sentencing hearing.  The record amply demonstrates that the District Court
meaningfully considered the appropriate factors and imposed a procedurally and
substantively reasonable sentence.
III. Conclusion
Because the District Court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors and
because it was correct not to consider the potential disparity between federal and state
sentences, we will affirm.
